核扩散问题：六方会谈-国际热点-口译考点直击-英语听力，英语学习，英语口语，VOA，BBC，CNN英语听力下载,英语口译

六方会谈旨在寻找和平解决北朝鲜核问题的方式。六个参与国进行了一系列的会谈：中华人民共和国，大韩民国，朝鲜民主主义人民共和国，美利坚合众国，俄罗斯联邦和日本国。2003年朝鲜退出《不扩散核武器合约》是该和谈的起因。第四，第五轮会谈中所取得的明显进展由于一些外部的因素而无果而终。2003年至2007年的五轮谈判中，实质性进展极少。直到第五轮谈判的第三阶段，朝鲜同意关闭其核设施以换取燃料援助以及同美国和日本关系的进一步改善。

主要的分歧点是：

安全的保障——布政府2001年上台时，北朝鲜就提出了这个问题。朝鲜政府认定布什政权充满敌意并指控布什政权计划用武力推翻朝鲜政府。而布什总统在2002年的国情咨文中把朝鲜归为邪恶轴心国之一，进一步激化了这个矛盾。

轻水反应堆的建造——在1994年的核协议框架下，美国应为朝鲜建造两座轻水反应堆以换取朝方关闭其在宁边的石墨减速核电站。由于双方都未能兑现自己的诺言，该协议于2002年彻底流产。

能源的和平利用——虽然《不扩散武器合约》允许各国将核能源用于民用目的，但各国认为这是朝鲜开发核武器的幌子。

外交关系——朝鲜希望把同西方各国的外交关系正常化也作为其放弃核项目的条件之一。

经济制裁/贸易正常化——由于美国认为朝鲜缺乏合作态度和拆除其核项目的意愿，长期以来对朝鲜实施非常严厉的经济制裁。此外，中国也采取行动冻结了朝鲜在澳门银行2400万美元的存款账户。由于朝鲜于2006年9月擅自进行核试验，联合国安理会通过了1718号决议，冻结一切向朝鲜的奢侈品出口。

The six-party talks aim to find a peaceful resolution to the security concerns as a result of the North Korean nuclear weapons program. There has been a series of meetings with six participating states: the People's Republic of China; the Republic of Korea (South Korea); the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); the United States of America; the Russian Federation; and Japan. These talks were a result of North Korea withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003. Apparent gains following the fourth and fifth rounds were reversed by outside events. Five rounds of talks from 2003 to 2007 produced little net progress until the third phase of the fifth round of talks, when North Korea agreed to shut down its nuclear facilities in exchange for fuel aid and steps towards the normalization of relations with the United States and Japan.

The main points of contention are:

Security guarantee - this issue has been raised by North Korea since the Bush administration (2001 - Present) took office. North Korea labels the Bush Administration as being hostile and accuses it of planning to overthrow the North Korean government by force. This concern was elevated when President George W. Bush named North Korea as part of the axis of evil in his State of the Union Address in 2002.

The construction of light water reactors - under the 1994 Agreed Framework two light-water reactors would be built in return for the closure of North Korea's graphite-moderated nuclear power plant program at Yongbyon. This agreement broke down after both sides defaulted, especially since 2002.

'Peaceful' use of nuclear energy - whilst the NPT allows states the right to use nuclear energy for civilian purposes, this is thought to have been used by North Korea as a cover for their nuclear weapons program.

Diplomatic relations - North Korea wants normalization of diplomatic relations as part of the bargain for giving up its nuclear weapons program.

Financial restrictions / Trade normalization - The U.S. has placed heavy financial sanctions on North Korea for what they see as an uncooperative attitude and unwillingness to dismantle its nuclear weapons program. In addition, other parties such as China had taken actions such as the freezing of North Korean assets in foreign bank accounts, such as the US$24 million in Macau's Banco Delta Asia. With the nuclear test on October 9, 2006, UNSCR 1718 was passed, which included a ban on all luxury goods to North Korea.

采访美国助理国务卿克里斯托弗·希尔：

最近人们对美国关于朝鲜核项目情报的可信度产生了疑问。现在让我们回顾一下历史：2002年布什政府坚持认为北朝鲜正在开发以铀为主的核武器项目，所以停止同朝鲜继续谈判。现在我们又发现美国所获得的情报可能并没有如此可靠？

首先，我们的评估报告一直认为朝鲜试图并已经成功地购买到了能成功组建一个铀浓缩项目的各种零件。但是他们究竟离成功生产出高度浓缩铀核项目还有多远却非常难说。但是依我们的观点，朝鲜方面确实一直在世界各地购买零件。只有了解他们的所有行动，我们才能为朝鲜出具“健康证明”。所以现在离真正解决问题还很远。

北朝鲜是否只有坦白所有的铀浓缩项目才能换取同美国关系正常化的谈判呢？

那是肯定的。在这60天内，我们首先希望迫使他们关闭所有的反应堆，停止生产钚这种可存在70万年左右的危险化学元素。我们还必须知道现在朝鲜的钚储量到底有多大，我们的估计大概是在50公斤左右。最后我们还必须调查朝方在铀浓缩方面的进展情况。朝鲜购买了离心机，还拥有了一种能连接离心机的特种铝材料，所以我们也必须在这点上继续调查下去，而不能妄自推断。必须在这些问题上一查到底。

朝鲜被美国国务院称为资助恐怖主义的国家之一。这样对恢复两国关系正常化有什么好处吗？

要恢复两国关系正常化还会遇到很多的障碍。本周在纽约举行的会议上，我们也和朝鲜代表讨论了朝鲜仍列在美国资助恐怖主义国家的“黑名单”上的问题。我们讨论了一些其中的历史原因和朝鲜为从“黑名单”上除名而作出的努力。有非常积极的信号显示朝鲜现在意识到核武器对本国的和平和富强并没有多大好处，反而起到反作用。我们希望他们能放弃核武器，以便继续推进正常化的进程。

An interview with US assistant secretary of state Christopher Hill：

There have been questions recently raised over the reliability of U.S. intelligence in North Korea's nuclear program. And just a little history: In 2002 the Bush administration maintained that North Korea was pursuing a uranium-based weapons program, stopped talking to North Korea, based partly — or mostly — on that. Now we find that the U.S. intelligence says it's not so confident that North Korea does have a uranium program.

Well, first of all, we do continue to assess that North Korea has attempted and succeeded in buying a number of parts to put together a uranium-enrichment program. How far they got and whether they were successful in actually manufacturing highly enriched uranium, that's hard to say. But in our view, there's no question they were purchasing parts from a number of places in the world, and it's something that we're going to have to really run to ground. I mean, we're going to have to know precisely what they've done on this before we can give them a clean bill of health. So we're still a ways away from finally resolving this.

Now, does North Korea have to, in a sense, fess up on uranium enrichment for talks on normalization to move forward?

They sure do. I mean, we have — the first thing we've done in this 60-day period we're in now is we're hoping to get them to shut down the reactor, stop producing plutonium — you know, a rather dangerous substance that sticks around for 700,000 years. So we'd like them to stop the plutonium. Then we've got to get a hold of, you know what the stocks of plutonium already are; we estimate they have some 50 kilos of it. And then finally we've got to figure out what they have done on highly enriched uranium.

They have purchased centrifuges, they have purchased this very specialized aluminum that connects the centrifuges in something called a cascade, so that — we've really got to run that to ground, because we can't have a situation where there's some kind of creative ambiguity where we pretend they've done something and — or, they pretend they've done something and we pretend to believe them. So yeah, we've got a lot of work to do on this.

North Korea is on the State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. How does that fit into the possibility of normalization?

Well, you know, normalization poses a number of obstacles, and so we've gotten a start on that in our meetings this week in New York. We've talked to them about the issue of their being on this list of state sponsors of terrorism. We've discussed some of the historical reasons why they're on the list, and talked to them about things they've done to try to get off the list. So we've got to work through that. And I would say what we're trying to do is, as they denuclearize — and, you know, there are some encouraging signs that they've finally understood that these nuclear weapons are not going to bring them peace and prosperity, but in fact are leading them quite in the opposite direction. So there are some encouraging signs, and we hope that as they denuclearize, we can get on with the task of normalization.